Brainstorming How to Calm the “Proof of Brain Storm” (Part 2 -- Complex Version)
As I mentioned in a reply to @proofofbrainio’s earlier post about the 32k POB awarded for a single self-voted comment, I envisioned both a simple solution and a complex solution to that ‘crisis’ -- and the two were not mutually exclusive.
I posted my ‘simple’ solution shortly thereafter, and now I will attempt to explain the ‘complex’ solution.
I tried to explain my ‘complex’ solution to @proofofbrainio via discord quite some time ago, but I was too inarticulate to convince him to adopt any of my suggestions. He said he was cool with me trying to explain it here, in the hope that I might be able to improve my explanation and/or someone else might catch the ‘vision’ and be able to explain it better.
However, it has taken me several weeks now to find enough time to try to re-explain those initial thoughts. As such, the ‘window of opportunity’ with respect to implementing this concept for the POB token has likely passed.
Also, with all that said, a ‘solution’ is no longer needed for that particular ‘proof of brain storm’. The ‘storm’ associated with the 32k excessive POB was quickly calmed with minimal disruption to the overall launch of the POB token and the proofofbrain.io website.
This is due to  the willingness of @no-advice to return the 32k POB tokens and to be voluntarily muted from the tribe for a month (until the excess tokens could be fully unstaked and returned),  @eonwarped’s swift and thorough calculation of the POB author rewards that would have been earned had that ‘excessive award’ never occurred, and  @proofofbrainio seeing to it that the affected authors (myself included) actually received those adjusted POB awards.
So, with all that said, this post is probably moot (as a suggestion about how to change the distribution of POB) and more of an effort to explain to a broader audience my vision of a potentially more robust way to ensure the integrity of “proof of brain” curation in general (whether it applies to POB or HIVE or LEO or STEM or CTP or ARCHON or NEOXAG or some future token).
FWIW, it is unclear to me whether the suggestion I made to @proofofbrainio several weeks ago (and will try to articulate herein) is even feasible, given the fact that the POB landscape has been established; even so, I want to put it ‘out there’ for folks to consider and critique, if not for use with POB then perhaps with some new token that is yet-to-be.
Two Tokens to Rule them All (well actually -- one to rule, one to sell)
The essence of my ‘vision’ is to utilize two tokens instead of just one. Or, you could think of it as a single token that is intentionally and irrevocably bifurcated upon issuance.
One part of the token is exchangeable and the other part is not. The exchangeable portion would be fully fungible, fully tradable, and thus would operate just the way the current POB token operates, except that it would not impart any ‘voting’ rights to its holders.
The non-exchangeable portion would be inextricably tied to the account that originally earned the token, would be automatically staked, and would be the sole token upon which future rewards (of both the fungible and non-exchangeable tokens) would be based. Both tokens would aways issue in the same amounts and to the same accounts -- hence the reason one might consider them as a single token, bifurcated at issuance.
Guarding against ‘Buying’ Influence
The net effect of this arrangement would be that no one would ever be able to ‘buy’ influence over the future distribution of either of the two tokens, because no one would be able ‘buy’ the voting tokens. The exception to this would be that an individual who has accumulated significant voting tokens (by authoring and curating quality content) could conceivably sell their account to someone looking to quickly acquire voting tokens (without actually putting in the long, hard work). I am not sure there would be any way to stop this sort of activity, so that possibility needs to be factored into the consideration.
Three Ways ...
I envisioned three different ways voting tokens could be specifically and irrevocably ‘tied’ to the account that earned them. One involves NFTs (a concept I haven’t fleshed out yet, and may not even be feasible), one involves auto-staking the voting tokens accompanied by an infinite unstaking time horizon, and the other involves the token-issuing account delegating staked voting tokens in lieu of actually issuing tokens to the recipient accounts.
Separating Investment Functionality from Proof of Brain and Proof of Stake Functionality
A primary goal of my thinking with this ‘two token’ model is to separate the ‘investment’ function of the token from the ‘proof of brain’ and ‘proof of stake’ functions.
Investors by-and-large do not care about ‘voting’ issues and would likely be less interested in holding crypto that requires them to actively do something -- especially if such action is required just to maintain their investment at its current levels. As such, POB and HIVE and LEO and similar tokens, in their current configurations, may be less attractive to investors than versions of those tokens that don’t require ongoing voting- or curation-related actions.
The Purported Benefits of a Two-Token Model …
So, to summarize, I see two potential advantages of this ‘two token’ system:
- Greater willingness of investors to purchase and hold the exchangeable token.
- Greater resilience against ‘hostile takeovers’ because voting shares are vested exclusively in the accounts themselves -- i.e the accounts that actually earned them.
I readily admit this is an idea that has not been fully fleshed out. As such, I eagerly and willingly invite constructive comments and criticisms.